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THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF PERSONAL DATA UNDER 
THE SINGAPORE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT 
It is important to examine and determine the meaning of 
“personal data” as it is the subject matter of the Singapore 
Data Protection regime. What constitutes “personal data” 
determines the scope of the Personal Data Protection Act. 
Although it is defined under the Act, the experience in other 
jurisdictions has shown that the elements of that (and other 
forms of) definition can still give rise to some difficulty in its 
application to specific cases. In this paper, the authors aim to 
provide some guidance and recommendations for the 
interpretation of “personal data” within the context of 
legislative intent and objective. 
Warren B CHIK 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Tulane), LLM (UCL); 
Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law,  
Singapore Management University School of Law. 
PANG Keep Ying Joey 
BSc (Economics) (Singapore Management University),  
JD (Singapore Management University); 
Practice Trainee, Rajah & Tann LLP. 
I. Introduction 
1 The enactment of the Personal Data Protection Act 20121 
(“PDPA”) on 20 November 2012 marks an important milestone for 
Singapore’s technology law framework. It puts in place a comprehensive 
set of provisions that provides for baseline standards and requirements 
for the protection of personal information as well as a regime for the 
protection of the general public from unwanted voice, fax and text 
messages. All private organisations are subjected to the data protection 
obligations under the Act; although it is noteworthy that, unlike some 
other jurisdictions, public agencies are exempted.2 The PDPA fills the 
lacuna in Singapore’s data protection regime that prior to the Act 
comprised only sector-specific legislation and regulations.3 
                                                                       
1 Act 26 of 2012. 
2 Under s 4(1)(c) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012), the data 
protection provisions of the Act will not apply to “any public agency or an 
organisation in the course of acting on behalf of a public agency in relation to the 
collection, use or disclosure of the personal data”. 
3 However, existing sector-specific legislation and regulations will continue to apply 
as the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) was devised to be a 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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2 With the data protection provisions of the PDPA4 due to enter 
into force on 2 July 2014, there is increased attention and interest on the 
meaning of the various data protection provisions under the Act. The 
provisions define the parameters of a private organisation’s data 
protection obligations and the concomitant rights of the individual to 
the protection of his or her personal information. Central to this 
inquiry is the concept of “personal data” and what it encompasses, as the 
data protection obligations under the Act apply only when private 
organisations are dealing with personal data. In other words, “personal 
data” is the subject matter of the obligations under the personal data 
protection regime and determines the scope of its application. In 
contrast, the other exemptions contained within s 4 of the Act, including 
the public agency exemption, are exceptions to the PDPA regime; and 
the even more limited exceptions pursuant to s 17 and the relevant 
Schedules to the Act only relate to the consent, access and correction 
requirements. 
II. Overview 
3 This article will examine the possible meanings of “personal 
data” under the PDPA. Section 2(1) of the PDPA provides a statutory 
definition of “personal data” as “data, whether true or not, about an 
individual who can be identified from that data; or from that data and 
other information to which the organisation has or is likely to have 
access”. Nevertheless, different meanings of personal data can arise 
because of the different interpretive approaches that one can adopt for 
the various elements of the statutory definition. 
4 In this regard, the interpretive approaches to deciphering the 
meaning of personal data, with reference to the purpose of the Act, will 
shed light on the various elements that define personal data under s 2(1) 
of the PDPA. Cases from other countries that have interpreted the same 
or similar definitions of personal data will also be helpful in predicting 
the likely scope and coverage of the Act, taking into consideration the 
political, cultural and socio-economic background of these jurisdictions. 
5 In the first part of this article, the authors will identify the 
general purpose of the statute and consider the policy objectives of the 
PDPA by examining the purpose provision found in the Act against the 
backdrop of relevant extrinsic materials such as Parliamentary Reports 
relating to the passage of the Act, relevant foreign data protection 
                                                                                                                               
complementary Act. Section 4(6)(b) states that “the provisions of other written law 
shall prevail to the extent that any provision of Parts III to VI is inconsistent with 
the provisions of that other written law”. 
4 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Pts III–VI, ss 11–26. 
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statutes that were referred to during the development of the Act as well 
as the advisory guidelines issued by the Personal Data Protection 
Commission (“PDPC”),5 which is the primary enforcement agency of 
the PDPA. It will be shown that the PDPA seeks to promote three main 
objectives: (a) to give individuals the right to data protection in a 
balanced manner that does not impose overly onerous compliance costs 
on private organisations; (b) to recognise the qualified right of private 
organisations to collect, use and disclose personal data so as to enhance 
Singapore’s competitiveness and strengthen its position as a trusted 
business hub; and (c) to develop Singapore into a global data hub by 
ensuring that Singapore is on par with major economies that have data 
protection laws so as to facilitate cross-border data transfers. 
6 The authors will explore the two possible approaches to the 
interpretation of personal data in the second part of the article:  
(a) a broad and expansive approach; or (b) a balance-of-interests 
approach. The different approaches stem from the two ways in which 
the purpose of the PDPA could be understood and promoted, and the 
authors will submit that a broad and expansive approach is to be 
preferred in order to better meet the purpose and policy objectives of 
the PDPA identified in part one and to provide conceptual clarity. 
7 In the third and final part of this article, the authors will 
examine in detail the definition of personal data under the PDPA by 
analysing each element within its meaning under s 2, again by reference 
to relevant Parliamentary Reports, PDPC guidelines and materials from 
jurisdictions that were referred to during the development of the Act. 
This part will examine the meaning of each of the four key elements of 
“personal data” under the Act, which can be broken down into the 
following: 
(a) “data”; 
(b) “whether true or not”; 
(c) “about an individual”; and 
(d) “an individual who can be identified” (and the sources 
of data). 
This exercise, using the proposed broad and expansive interpretative 
approach, is done with a view to clarifying the meaning and parameters 
of what should constitute personal data under the PDPA in Singapore. 
Hopefully, this can provide some guidance to the courts, the PDPC and 
                                                                       
5 The Personal Data Protection Commission was established as a statutory body  
on 2 January 2013. See the Personal Data Protection Commission website 
<http://www.pdpc.gov.sg/personal-data-protection-act> (accessed 7 May 2014). 
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the primary stakeholders when the issue of compliance arises within 
their jurisdiction, mandate and practice respectively. 
8 In the appendix to this article, the authors will specifically 
consider whether Internet protocol addresses (“IP addresses”), telephone 
numbers and e-mail addresses, should generally be recognised as 
personal data under the PDPA. 
III. Purpose and policy objectives of the PDPA 
9 Deciphering the purpose of the PDPA is an important and 
necessary step to determining the statutory meaning of personal data. 
Before we look at the objectives of the PDPA, it is apposite to make 
some brief observations on statutory interpretation and specifically the 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
A. Statutory interpretation in Singapore: The purposive 
approach 
10 The Interpretation Act6 (“IA”) provides guidance for statutory 
interpretation in Singapore and mandates the purposive interpretation 
of statutory provisions. Specifically, s 9A(1) of the IA states that: 
In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation 
that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law 
(whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law 
or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote 
that purpose or object. 
With reference to the above provision, purposive interpretation hence 
entails the evaluation of the appropriateness of a statutory 
interpretation based on whether or not an interpretation would 
“promote the purpose or object” of the statute in question. 
Consequently, the determination of the purpose or object of a statute 
plays a key role in statutory interpretation. 
11 As a matter of practice, such determinations can be made from 
the purpose provision of the statute (if there is one) as well as from the 
objectives that can be determined from reading the statute as a whole. 
Secondary materials such as policy and consultation papers as well as 
parliamentary debates and, in this case, PDPC guidelines can also be 
“capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of [a] 
provision” and due consideration may be given to them under the 
circumstances stated in s 9A(2) of the IA. 
                                                                       
6 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed. 
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12 In line with s 9A, the Singapore judiciary has made the 
purposive approach the dominant, if not the paramount approach, to 
statutory interpretation. Since the enactment of s 9A in 1993, the courts 
have consistently ruled, on the basis of s 9A, that the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation is to be preferred.7 More recently, 
this position was affirmed by Sundaresh Menon CJ in the Court of 
Appeal decision of Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte  
Ltd8 (“Dorsey James Michael”). In Dorsey James Michael, Menon CJ 
pronounced that “[i]n Singapore, any discussion on statutory 
interpretation must take place against the backdrop of s 9A of the 
Interpretation Act”.9 For the avoidance of doubt, the purposive reading 
of statutory provisions applies even when “on a plain reading, the words 
of the statutory provisions are unambiguous or do not produce 
unreasonable or absurd results”.10 The purposive approach is hence to be 
applied in every instance of statutory interpretation. 
13 Adopting a purposive interpretation means that Singaporean 
courts can, when appropriate, deviate from the literal meaning of the 
provision examined. In Comptroller of Income Tax v GE Pacific Pte Ltd,11 
Yong Pung How CJ stated in the Court of Appeal that “s 9A(1) clearly 
compels [the court] to put Parliament’s intention into effect and allows 
[the court] to look beyond the words of [the statutory provision 
concerned]”.12 More recently, V K Rajah JA also stated in Public 
Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng13 (“Low Kok Heng”) that a purposive 
approach “allows the judge the latitude to look beyond the four corners 
of the statute, should he find it necessary to ascribe a wider or narrower 
interpretation to its words”.14 
14 However, the court’s right to deviate from the literal meaning of 
provisions is not one without limits. As noted by Rajah JA in Low Kok 
Heng, “the purposive approach stipulated by s 9A is constrained by the 
parameters set by the literal text of the provision”.15 Hence, taking into 
consideration the above decisions, it would appear that courts can 
                                                                       
7 Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803 at [44]; Planmarine AG v 
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669 at [22]; Public 
Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [39]. 
8 [2013] 3 SLR 354. 
9 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [16]. 
10 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [19] 
confirming Planmarine AG v Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999]  
1 SLR(R) 669 at [22]. 
11 [1994] 2 SLR(R) 948. 
12 Comptroller of Income Tax v GE Pacific Pte Ltd [1994] 2 SLR(R) 948 at [26]. 
13 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183. 
14 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [30]; Goh Yihan, 
“Statutory Interpretation in Singapore: 15 Years on from Legislative Reform” 
(2009) 21 SAcLJ 97 at 109, para 12. 
15 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [57]. 
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deviate from the literal meaning of provisions to “put Parliament’s 
intention into effect” but only if such deviation is not outside the 
“parameters set by the literal text of the provision”; in other words, 
where such deviation is within the possible range of meanings that can 
be accommodated by the literal text of the provision at hand. 
15 The determination of the purpose and objective of the statute 
will also often involve the use of relevant extrinsic materials. As the 
Court of Appeal observed in The Seaway,16 a “purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation would invariably involve reference to extrinsic 
materials that may assist in the interpretation of the statutory 
provision”.17 Although there was earlier some uncertainty as to whether 
reference to extrinsic material is allowed if the literal meaning of a 
provision is clear, this is no longer in doubt after Low Kok Heng. In that 
decision, Rajah JA emphasised that “extrinsic material may be referred 
to by the courts in statutory interpretation even where the meaning of 
the provision in issue is clear on its face”.18 All that is required is that 
courts when admitting the extrinsic materials consider “the desirability 
of persons being able to rely on the ordinary meaning conveyed by the 
text of the provision taking into account its context in the written law 
and the purpose or object underlying the written law”19 and “the need to 
avoid prolonging legal or other proceedings without compensating 
advantage”.20 
16 Finally, by stating that a purposive approach is to be 
“preferred”,21 the IA arguably permits the use of other methods of 
interpretation under the right conditions. This view is supported 
judicially. In Low Kok Heng, Rajah JA examined the purposive approach 
under s 9A(1) of the IA and stated that:22 
Other common law principles come into play only when their 
application coincides with the purpose underlying the written law in 
question, or alternatively, when ambiguity in that written law persists 
even after an attempt at purposive interpretation has been properly 
made. 
B. Interpreting purpose provisions 
17 Besides the above general observations, there is also the issue of 
how purpose provisions ought to be interpreted and whether reference 
                                                                       
16 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 435. 
17 The Seaway [2005] 1 SLR(R) 435 at [25]. 
18 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [45]. 
19 Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) s 9A(4)(a). 
20 Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) s 9A(4)(b). 
21 Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) s 9A(1). 
22 Public Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [41]. 
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to extrinsic materials should be allowed when deriving the meaning of 
such provisions. Prima facie, it appears that a purpose provision, like 
any other statutory provision, ought to be interpreted purposively as 
mandated under s 9A(1) of the IA. That “there is no blanket rule that a 
provision must be ambiguous or inconsistent before a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation can be taken”,23 can also be taken as 
further support of the position that purpose provisions ought to be 
purposively interpreted. 
18 However, the purposive interpretation of purpose provisions 
can be problematic in practice. To purposively interpret a provision, 
a court would typically employ a three-step approach. First, the court 
would determine the general purpose of the statute and, if possible, the 
purpose of the specific provision at hand, by referring to the purpose 
provision and relevant extrinsic materials, such as the parliamentary 
speech by the Minister moving the Bill containing the provision during 
the Bill’s second reading. Secondly, the court would then consider the 
range of meanings supportable by the text of the provision. Lastly, the 
court would decide on an interpretation by ensuring that the chosen 
interpretation best promotes the predetermined purpose of the statute. 
However, applying this approach to the interpretation of a purpose 
provision would be problematic as this would be a self-referencing and 
tautological exercise. Given that the purpose of a statute needs to be 
determined before a purposive approach can be utilised and that the 
purpose provision is meant to explain the objective of the statute, it is 
difficult to see how the purpose provision can be concomitantly 
subjected to the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
Moreover, that will mean that secondary material could in fact be just 
as, if not more, important in interpreting a statute than the purpose 
provisions which (unlike the former) forms part of the written law. It is 
thus submitted that the purposive approach should thus not be 
applicable for the interpretation of purpose provisions. 
19 Instead it is submitted that purpose provisions ought to be 
interpreted in one of two ways. First, where there are no relevant and 
admissible extrinsic materials available, the literal meaning of the 
purpose provision should determine the purpose of the statute. 
Alternatively, where there are relevant and admissible extrinsic 
materials, the purpose should then be determined by considering such 
extrinsic materials against the literal meaning of the purpose provision. 
Consideration of the extrinsic materials will thus expand or narrow the 
literal meaning of the purpose provision, subject to the limit that it does 
not go beyond the parameters set by the literal text of the purpose 
provision. A purpose provision tends to constitute generalised statements 
                                                                       
23 Planmarine AG v Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669 
at [22]. 
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of its objectives rather than to serve as more specific guidance for  
the interpretation of specific provisions. Nevertheless, the purpose 
provision is important as it is that part of the statute (“written law”) 
that sets out the objective of the Act and that should not be overridden 
by secondary materials, which should serve merely as affirming or 
assisting in the interpretation of specific provisions. It is also there as a 
reminder to any person interpreting the Act of its main objectives. 
C. Purpose of the PDPA 
(1) The purpose provision of the PDPA 
20 Determining the objective of the PDPA is vital as the purpose so 
determined will provide guidance on interpreting the other provisions 
of the Act. In particular, it will be useful in determining what is a fair 
balance of the interests stated therein in cases where more than one 
stakeholder and a variety of interests are enunciated. It will also be 
instructive on the overarching goal of the statute. Consequently, it will 
also be useful when applying the objective-subjective “reasonable 
person” test in various provisions of the Act (such as the general 
compliance rule with respect to the protection of personal data 
contained in s 11), and when considering what would be an acceptable 
exception or an appropriate exemption to the general obligations for 
organisations dealing with personal data that are contained in the Act. 
Given that a purpose provision exists in the PDPA, the interpretation of 
this provision would provide the objective for the PDPA. Specifically, s 3 
of the PDPA states that: 
The purpose of this Act is to govern the collection, use and disclosure 
of personal data by organisations in a manner that recognises both the 
right of individuals to protect their personal data and the need of 
organisations to collect, use or disclose personal data for purposes that 
a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances. 
21 Prima facie, two observations can be made from the above.  
First, s 3 defines the scope of the PDPA as covering only issues that 
regulate the collection, use and disclosure of personal data by private 
organisations. Second and more importantly, these regulations are to be 
guided by two main parameters. These parameters include the right of 
the individual to protect their personal data and the need of private 
organisations to collect, use and disclose personal data (but subject to 
purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the 
circumstances). 
22 In the subsequent paragraphs, the rights of both the individual 
and organisations will be referred to. Although s 3 only refers to an 
organisation’s “need”, the fact is that the extent of the individual’s “right” 
is curbed by the organisation’s “need” and as such they are but two sides 
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of the same coin. Both rights are not absolute, but rather, qualified by 
the test of reasonableness. 
(2) Right of the individual to protect their personal data 
23 The PDPA’s recognition of “the right of individuals to protect 
their personal data”24 means that for the first time, the individual is 
conferred the right to personal data protection generally. However, this 
right is not without limits. As made clear by s 3 of the PDPA, the 
individual’s personal data will not be protected when the personal data 
is collected, used or disclosed by private organisations for purposes 
deemed appropriate by a reasonable person in the circumstances. 
Compliance costs to organisations also affect the extent of protection 
accorded as Parliament made clear that the PDPA takes “the approach of 
protecting individuals’ personal data without imposing overly-onerous 
requirements on organisations”.25 
24 This right also appears to be a discrete and more focused right 
to data protection as opposed to being a more fundamental right to 
privacy (as a human right) or data privacy. 
25 First, this right to data protection is not analogous to, or derived 
from, the right to privacy. Although all the jurisdictions referenced26 
(“referenced jurisdictions”) during the development of the PDPA by the 
Ministry of Communications and Information (“MCI”) take the view 
that the right to data protection is analogous to, or at least derived in 
part from, the right of privacy; this was not reflected in the PDPA. The 
concept of privacy does not feature in any of the PDPA’s data protection 
provisions. That privacy forms the basis of the right to data protection 
was also not mentioned in the parliamentary speeches of the Minister 
for Information, Communications and the Arts (“Minister”) who 
moved the Bill at its second reading. 
26 Further support for the view that the right of data protection is 
distinct from the right to privacy can also be found by examining the 
PDPA’s adaptation of the purpose provision from Canada’s Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”).27 
                                                                       
24 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 3. 
25 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal  
Data Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). The Ministry for Information, Communications 
and the Arts became the Ministry of Communications and Information after a 
restructuring exercise on 1 November 2012. 
26 Jurisdictions that were referenced during the development of the Personal Data 
Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) include Australia, Canada, the European 
Union, Hong Kong, New Zealand and the UK. 
27 RSC 2000, c 5 (Can) s 3. 
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Although the PDPA’s purpose provision shares an identical structure 
with its counterpart in the PIPEDA,28 the PDPA adaptation of the 
purpose provision specifically excludes mention that it “recognises the 
right of privacy of individuals”.29 Instead, the PDPA states that it 
recognises “the right to individuals to protect their personal data”. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the “right of individuals to protect 
their personal data”30 ought to be limited to what is provided under the 
PDPA provisions and not construed wider as incorporating protection 
for privacy. 
27 Besides, reading the right to data protection as limited to the 
PDPA provisions ensures greater compatibility with Singapore’s current 
laws. As Singapore has hitherto not recognised an individual’s right to 
privacy in statute and the common law, having a right to data protection 
informed by PDPA provisions as opposed to one flowing from privacy 
would sit better with the current laws of Singapore. This view also 
reflects Parliament’s intentions. At the second reading of the Personal 
Data Protection Bill, the Minister stated that the PDPA “does not seek to 
change any right or obligation conferred by or imposed under the 
common law”.31 Hence, since no general right to privacy exists in 
Singapore and the PDPA has not indirectly created this right, the right 
to data protection therefore ought to be defined solely by the PDPA 
provisions. 
28 Secondly, the right to data protection under the PDPA is also 
not a fundamental right. In the European Union (“EU”), the right to 
data protection is a fundamental right enshrined in Art 8 of the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights32 and statutes incompatible with this 
fundamental right would be struck down by the European Court of 
Justice. In contrast, the PDPA yields to conflicting statutes. Specifically, 
s 4(6)(b) of the PDPA provides that: 
… the provisions of other written law shall prevail to the extent that 
any provision of Parts III to VI [the data protection provisions] is 
inconsistent with the provisions of that other written law. 
The right to data protection under the PDPA is thus neither a 
fundamental one nor based upon one. 
                                                                       
28 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (RSC 2000, c 5) 
(Can) s 3. 
29 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (RSC 2000, c 5) 
(Can) s 3. 
30 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 3. 
31 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
32 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (18 December 2000). 
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(3) Right of private organisations to collect, use or disclose personal 
data 
29 The right of private organisations to collect, use or disclose 
personal data is also a qualified one. As observed in s 3 of the PDPA, this 
right is subject to the purpose being considered as appropriate by a 
reasonable person under the circumstances. In this regard, the 
curtailment of this right is directly reflective of the tension between an 
individual’s right to data protection and an organisation’s right to data 
exploitation. 
30 This objective-subjective test – the objective person in a 
subjective set of circumstances – is a neutral test and in fact serves to 
define the line between the “rights” of individuals to the protection of 
their personal data and of organisations to exploit them. Just as an 
individual’s right to data protection may not extend to a situation where 
it imposes too onerous a cost on private organisations, the right of the 
private organisations to exploit personal data is constrained to the 
extent that it violates the right of individuals’ to protection of their 
personal data to an unreasonable degree. 
31 Section 11 of the PDPA reinforces the premise that the primary 
duty is on the organisation to comply with the Act. Subsection 1 states 
that the organisation must be the one to consider whether their 
practices are what a reasonable person would consider appropriate 
under the circumstances. Subsection 2 further stipulates that “[a]n 
organisation is responsible for personal data in its possession or under 
its control”. 
32 By recognising a qualified right of private organisations to 
exploit personal data, Parliament’s intention behind the promulgation 
of this right appears to arise from three considerations. 
33 The first consideration is focused on the compliance costs 
arising from the PDPA and the effect that such costs will have on 
organisations’ (in particular, the small and medium enterprises 
(“SMEs”)) ability to continue to function effectively and in a sustainable 
manner. As the Minister noted in reply to queries on compliance costs 
during the second reading of the Bill, “the issue of compliance costs, 
especially for SMEs … is a key consideration … in developing this Bill” 
and that efforts “have been sought to mitigate compliance costs for 
businesses where possible”.33 
                                                                       
33 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
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34 That the PDPC has moved to actively help SMEs cope with the 
PDPA also further supports this consideration. In May 2013, the PDPC 
announced that together with SPRING Singapore, a statutory board 
under the Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry responsible for 
helping Singapore enterprises, it “will work closely with SME Centres to 
reach out to their members and to support their business advisors in 
helping the SMEs on personal data protection matters”.34 The PDPC  
is also working closely with the Workforce Development Agency,  
a statutory board under the Singapore Ministry of Manpower 
responsible for promoting work skills training, “to incorporate data 
protection competencies into existing training frameworks”.35 All these 
measures are designed to help SMEs meet their obligations under the 
PDPA by ensuring that their data protection officers have the necessary 
capabilities and knowledge of the PDPA for practical compliance. 
35 Secondly, Parliament also considered the broader issue of 
Singapore’s competitiveness as a business destination when it decided to 
recognise this qualified right to exploit personal data. Specifically, the 
Minister considered that a “data protection regime can help promote 
business innovation and enhance competitiveness” and that personal 
data, “if appropriately used, can lead to better services and products that 
help local businesses become more competitive”.36 It thus follows that 
the PDPA “will also enhance Singapore’s competitiveness and strengthen 
[Singapore’s] position as a trusted business hub”.37 
36 Lastly, it is clear that Parliament intends for the PDPA to play a 
key role in developing Singapore into a global data hub. As noted by the 
Minister during the second reading of the Bill, the PDPA supports 
“Singapore’s development as a global data hub by providing a conducive 
environment for global data management industries, such as cloud 
computing and business analytics, to operate in Singapore”.38 More 
specifically, Parliament intends for the PDPA to facilitate this 
development by using the PDPA to “put Singapore on par with the 
                                                                       
34 Personal Data Protection Commission, “PDPC Prepares Businesses for the 
Personal Data Protection Act” (15 May 2013). 
35 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
36 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
37 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
38 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
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growing list of countries that have enacted data protection laws and 
facilitate cross-border transfers of data”.39 
(4) The three objectives of the PDPA 
37 Having examined the purpose provision and its component 
parts alongside relevant extrinsic materials, one can conclude that the 
PDPA has three main objectives. First, the PDPA recognises the qualified 
right of individuals to data protection. However, the content of this 
right will be defined by the data protection provisions40 under the PDPA 
and does not flow from the right of privacy. This right is also not a 
fundamental right and its ambit will be limited to the extent that it 
would not make working with personal data too onerous for private 
organisations. 
38 Second, the PDPA recognises the need of private organisations 
to collect, use and disclose personal data and has provided private 
organisations with a qualified right to do so under a “principle-based 
and technology-neutral approach”.41 Besides ensuring that such a 
qualified right does not overreach and render the individual’s right to 
data protection meaningless, the PDPA also seeks to streamline and 
strengthen Singapore’s businesses and her competitiveness through the 
granting of this qualified right, both domestically and globally, so as to 
facilitate transactions which would have otherwise bypassed Singapore 
due to the lack of a data protection framework. 
39 Third, the PDPA supports the development of Singapore into a 
global data hub. To do so, where it is possible, the PDPA seeks to be on 
par with the data protection regimes of other countries, especially those 
of major economies such as the jurisdictions referenced by the MCI 
during the development of the PDPA. A robust data protection regime 
will attract data management industries to the island and facilitate 
cross-border transfers of data to and from Singapore. 
IV. Two possible approaches to defining the scope of personal 
data 
40 From the above general purposes of the PDPA, it would appear 
that the purposive interpretation of personal data to define its scope of 
                                                                       
39 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
40 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Pts III–VI, ss 11–26. 
41 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
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coverage could take one of two general approaches: a balance-of-
interests approach or a broad and expansive approach. 
A. Balance-of-interests approach 
41 First, one could employ a balance-of-interests approach that 
construes personal data contextually; that is, what constitutes personal 
data will be determined by considering whether such a reading 
promotes the right of individuals to data protection while not making 
compliance overly onerous for private organisations working with 
personal data. Arguably, this approach is in line with the general 
purposes of the PDPA under s 3,42 as it promotes the right of individuals 
to data protection to the extent that it does not overburden private 
organisations when it comes to compliance. 
42 Adopting this approach would also put Singapore on par with 
some of the jurisdictions referenced by the PDPA. Specifically, Hong 
Kong and Australia have in their data protection legislations the 
requirement that identification of personal data should be conducted 
“practicably” and “reasonably” respectively. For Hong Kong, among 
other requirements, data is personal data if “it is practicable for the 
identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained”43 from 
the data, with “practicable” further defined as “reasonably practicable”.44 
43 As for Australia, its federal and state legislations have defined 
personal information, the analogue to personal data under the PDPA, as 
information about, inter alia, an individual whose identity “can 
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion”.45 Judicial 
pronouncements on what is “reasonable” in Australia appear to be 
guided by factual considerations,46 with special attention given to the 
circumstances involved in each case. Even though this part of the 
provision was recently changed to “reasonably identifiable” on 12 March 
2014 following the passage of a law reform Bill by the Australian 
Parliament on 29 November 2012,47 this does not substantially change 
                                                                       
42 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 3. 
43 Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 1995 (Cap 486) (Hong Kong) s 2(1)(b). 
44 Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 1995 (Cap 486) (Hong Kong) s 2(1). 
45 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth) s 6; Cabinet Administrative 
Instruction No 1 of 1989 (SA); Privacy and Personal Information Act 1998  
(Act 133 of 1998) (NSW) s 4; Information Privacy Act 2000 (No 98 of 2000) (Vic) 
s 3; Information Act 2002 (NT) s 3; Personal Information Protection Act 2004 
(No 46 of 2004) (Tas) s 3; Information Privacy Bill 2007 (Bill No 193) (WA) s 6; 
Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) s 12. 
46 Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, “The Conceptual Basis of Personal Information in 
Australian Privacy Law” [2010] MurUEJL 1 at 18. 
47 Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Act No 197 of 
2012) (Cth). 
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the above analysis. As the main amendment is the removal of the words 
“from the information or opinion”, the consideration for reasonableness 
continues to apply in the amended Australian Privacy Act albeit in a 
different and much more contextual form. 
B. Broad and expansive approach 
44 Alternatively, a broad and expansive approach that confers a 
wide meaning to personal data could be adopted. Prima facie, this 
approach more strongly affirms the right of individuals to data 
protection under the PDPA but will entail greater responsibility for 
organisations that will lead to greater compliance costs. 
45 However, it should be noted that although legal responsibility 
for personal data would indeed expand under a broader definition, the 
wide statutory exemptions under the PDPA nevertheless still apply to 
counterbalance and lighten the burden on organisations. As noted 
previously, s 4 limits the application of the Act by generous exclusions 
including the exemption of various forms of organisations, public 
agents, data intermediaries and some individuals. The Act also does not 
apply to certain types of information (ie, business contact information) 
and the duration of protection is limited. Other exemptions under the 
Schedules to the PDPA (read with s 17 of the Act) also waive the need 
for private organisations that are still subject to the provisions of the Act 
to comply with certain data protection obligations under certain 
situations. Specifically, the Second to Fourth Scheds to the PDPA 
respectively permit the collection,48 use49 and disclosure50 of personal 
data without the consent of the individual under certain circumstances, 
while the Fifth and Sixth Scheds provide exceptions to the right of 
individuals to access51 and correct52 personal data held by an 
organisation. In other words, these measures already provide the 
counterweight in favour of organisations, and as such, a broader and 
more expansive interpretation of “personal data” in favour of 
individuals is justified and equitable. 
46 “Reasonableness” requirements under the PDPA also help to 
further prevent compliance costs and restrictions from becoming 
unduly onerous. Section 11(1) states that “[i]n meeting its 
responsibilities under this Act, an organisation shall consider what a 
reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances”. If 
that threshold is met, then according to s 3, the organisation would have 
                                                                       
48 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Second Sched. 
49 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Third Sched. 
50 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Fourth Sched. 
51 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Fifth Sched. 
52 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Sixth Sched. 
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met its responsibility under the Act. Specific provisions under the Act 
also extend this “reasonableness” test to different situations or 
obligations. For example, to ameliorate the harshness of the consent 
requirement, an organisation is deemed to have obtained the consent of 
an individual if the individual provides the personal data voluntary and 
it is “reasonable that the individual would voluntarily provide the data”.53 
Similarly, organisations need only comply with individuals’ request to 
access their personal data on an “as soon as reasonably possible” basis.54 
Organisations could also turn down requests to correct personal data by 
individuals if it is “satisfied on reasonable ground that a correction 
should not be made”.55 Furthermore, organisations would only need to 
make “reasonable effort to ensure that personal data … is accurate and 
complete”56 and protect personal data using “reasonable security 
arrangements”.57 Organisations would also only be made to cease 
retention of personal data when it is “reasonable to assume that”58 the 
business and legal purposes for which the data is collected are no longer 
being served. 
47 This approach is also supported by some jurisdictions 
referenced by the PDPA. In Canada, the federal judiciary has on 
multiple occasions59 mandated that personal information, the analogue 
of personal data under the PDPA, should be accorded a broad and 
expansive interpretation. 
48 Personal data is also widely construed in the EU and UK. As 
noted by the Article 29 Working Party60 in its opinion on the concept of 
personal data (“WP136”),61 the “definition [of personal data] reflects the 
intention of the European lawmaker for a wide notion of ‘personal data’, 
maintained throughout the legislative process”.62 Judicially, the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has also taken a broad view of personal data.  
                                                                       
53 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 15(1). 
54 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 21(1). 
55 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 22(2). 
56 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 23. 
57 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 24. 
58 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 25. 
59 Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance) [1997] 2 SCR 403 at [68] (dissenting 
judgment); Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Transportation Accident 
Investigation and Safety Board) 2006 FCA 157; Canada (Information Commissioner) v 
Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) [2003] 1 SCR 66; 
2003 SCC 8 at [23]. 
60 This is a working party set up under Art 29 of the European Union data protection 
directive, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(24 October 1995) (protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data). 
61 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007). 
62 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 4. 
© 2014 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 
370 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2014) 26 SAcLJ 
 
In the 2003 Swedish case of Bodil Lindqvist v Aklagarkammaren i 
Jonkoping,63 the ECJ took a broad view of personal data and held that 
information about a person’s working conditions and hobbies are 
personal data.64 
49 The UK Information Commissioner also followed the EU’s 
approach by taking a wide reading of personal data even though it 
continues to face some problems in reconciling this broad reading with 
the decision in Durant v Financial Services Authority65 (“Durant”). In 
Durant, the English Court of Appeal adopted a decidedly narrower 
interpretation of personal data by limiting personal data to 
“information that affects [one’s] privacy”.66 Despite the fact that Durant 
had been followed in subsequent cases and remains as “good” law, two 
developments since then that seem to confine Durant to the unique facts 
of that case are instructive. First, the UK Information Commissioner 
subsequently issued guidance on personal data in 2007 that purports to 
support both a broad reading of personal data and the decision in 
Durant;67 but it has been noted that the guidance is in substance an 
affirmation of the broad approach as adopted by the Article 29 Working 
Party.68 Second, in the Court of Appeal’s latest decision dealing with the 
interpretation of personal data, Edem v The Information Commissioner & 
Financial Services Authority69 (“Edem”), the judges distinguished Durant 
and seemed to relegate the effect of that decision to a much narrower 
situation. This will be considered in more detail later in this article. 
C. Justifying the adoption of the broad and expansive approach 
50 As noted in the previous two sections, two possible approaches, 
that are attractive for different reasons, are available for the 
interpretation of personal data under the PDPA. While both approaches 
will put Singapore on par with the data protection laws of major 
economies, since some major economies support either of the 
approaches,70 it is submitted that the broad and expansive approach to 
                                                                       
63 (C-101/01) [2003] ECR I-4989. 
64 Bodil Lindqvist v Aklagarkammaren i Jonkoping (C-101/01) [2003] ECR I-4989 
at [24]. 
65 [2003] EWCA Civ 1746. 
66 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 at [28], per Auld LJ. 
67 United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection Technical 
Guidance – Determining What is Personal Data (21 August 2007). 
68 Christopher Millard & Peter Church, “UK – ICO Guidance on Personal Data: 
Clarification or Further Confusion?” (Linklaters, 1 November 2007). 
69 [2014] EWCA Civ 92. 
70 The balance-of-interests approach appears to be supported by Australia, Hong 
Kong and New Zealand, while the broad and expansive approach has found 
support in Canada, the European Union and the UK. 
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the interpretation of personal data ought to be taken. Specifically, the 
broad and expansive approach should be preferred for three reasons. 
51 First, the broad and expansive approach to the interpretation of 
personal data should be preferred as it was specifically intended by 
Parliament. During the second reading of the Bill, the Minister noted, in 
reply to concerns that the definition of personal data was too broad and 
vague, that “it is necessary for the definition to be sufficiently broad to 
allow the Bill to apply to differing circumstances”.71 The broad 
interpretation of personal data also appears to be supported by the 
PDPC, which lists in its advisory guidelines that the definition of 
personal data “is not intended to be narrowly construed and covers all 
types of data from which an individual can be identified”.72 Such an 
approach will also be consistent with a purposive interpretation of  
the definition of “personal data” under s 2, rather than a literal 
interpretation, especially in relation to the interpretation of the phrase 
“[data] about an individual”. 
52 Secondly, a broad and expansive approach to the interpretation 
of personal data also sits better with the scheme of the PDPA. As 
observed earlier in this article, the PDPA has built-in exemptions and 
“reasonableness” requirements to prevent organisations from being 
overburdened by data protection obligations. A broad reading of 
personal data would thus sit well with the current scheme of the PDPA 
by complementing the above mechanisms with its greater recognition of 
the individual’s right to data protection to counterbalance the generous 
exceptions. It will also be fair and equitable to do so. 
53 Lastly, a broad and expansive view of personal data provides 
greater clarity to the concept of personal data. The broad and expansive 
approach offers a conceptually neater view of personal data as it 
determines personal data solely on the identifiability of the data at hand. 
In contrast, the balance-of-interests approach to the determination of 
personal data is more complicated, as it often requires additional 
considerations of “reasonableness” or “practicability”, considerations 
which are highly contextual and circumstantial in nature (and that  
may be duplicitous, given the tests that are already built into many of 
the obligations under the Act). Adopting a broad and expansive 
interpretation of personal data, which provides personal data with a 
more certain meaning, will actually make it easier for organisations to 
comply with the PDPA by reducing ambiguities over its definition. 
                                                                       
71 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
72 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.2. 
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V. Statutory definition of personal data under the PDPA 
54 Having explored the general purposes of the PDPA and 
identified the specific approach that should be taken for the purposive 
interpretation of personal data, we will now examine the statutory 
definition of personal data as provided under the PDPA. Specifically, the 
definition of personal data is provided under s 2 of the PDPA, which 
states that: 
‘personal data’ means data, whether true or not, about an individual 
who can be identified – 
(a) from that data; or 
(b) from that data and other information to which the 
organisation has or is likely to have access … 
A. Definitional similarities and differences with other 
jurisdictions 
55 The definition of personal data under the PDPA is very similar 
to its counterpart under the UK Data Protection Act 199873 (“DPA”). 
That this is the case is not unsurprising as the UK was one of the 
jurisdictions referenced during the development of the PDPA. 
Juxtaposing the PDPA with the DPA, the PDPA appears to have adopted 
the DPA’s structure in its definition of personal data but made some 
modifications. Specifically, s 1(1) of the DPA states that: 
‘personal data’ means data which relate to a living individual who can 
be identified – 
(a) from those data, or 
(b) from those data and other information which is in the 
possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data 
controller, and includes any expression of opinion about the 
individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller 
or any other person in respect of the individual … 
56 Prima facie, three main differences can be observed between the 
statutory definition of the PDPA and DPA. First, the PDPA did away 
with the requirement of a “living individual” in the DPA, suggesting that 
personal data could include that of deceased individuals for limited 
protection. This reading is borne out by s 4(4)(b) of the PDPA, which 
states that the provisions on disclosure and s 24 on the protection of 
personal data applies to “personal data about an individual who has 
been dead for 10 years or fewer”.74 
                                                                       
73 c 29. 
74 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 4(4)(b). 
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57 Secondly, the PDPA includes the additional qualifier of 
“whether true or not” to state that the veracity of information is an 
irrelevant consideration and that identification of individuals by the 
information involved remains the crux to determining personal data. 
This modification is probably inspired by Australia, being the only 
referenced jurisdiction that includes these words,75 and is consistent with 
the broad and expansive view of personal data supported by the PDPC.76 
Further, this qualifier arguably allows the possible admission of 
expressions of opinion as personal data under the PDPA. Even though 
the PDPA departs from the DPA by not specifying “expression of 
opinion”77 as admissible, expression of opinion could arguably still be 
admissible since the truth or otherwise of a statement is irrelevant. An 
opinion can fall anywhere along a scale between absolute truth on the 
one side and falsity on the other, being to some extent subjective in 
nature. 
58 Lastly, the PDPA also uses the associative term “about” as 
opposed to “relate to” in its definition of personal data. The use of 
“about” in the statutory definition of personal data is found in several 
jurisdictions including those referenced by the PDPA such as Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand. Specifically, it has been noted that 
Australian78 and New Zealand79 jurisprudence has taken the view that 
“about” is more restrictive than “relate to” in terms of how data could  
be associated with an individual. If the PDPA took this view into 
consideration in its use of “about” in the definition, then this would 
imply a more restrictive scope of information that could be associated 
with individuals in order to form personal data. However, this view is 
inconsistent with a broad reading of personal data and arguably80  
the term “about” should be synonymous with “relate to”81 in the 
local context. 
B. Elements of personal data under the PDPA 
59 Four main elements comprise the definition of “personal data” 
under s 2 of the PDPA. These four elements, which are (a) “data”; 
(b) “whether true or not”; (c) “about an individual”; and (d) “an 
                                                                       
75 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth) s 6. 
76 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at paras 5.7–5.8. 
77 Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK) s 1(1). 
78 Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, “The Conceptual Basis of Personal Information in 
Australian Privacy Law” [2010] MurUEJL 1 at 13. 
79 CBN v McKenzie Associates [2004] NZHRRT 48 at [39]. 
80 For further submissions on why the change of phasing from “relate to” to “about” 
is more semantic than material, see paras 77–90 below. 
81 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.3. 
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individual who can be identified” (from that data and/or other 
information that the organisation has or is likely to have access to), will 
be examined in the following sections. 
(1) “Data” 
60 The definition of “data” is important as it is the subject matter 
of the statutory protection under the data protection regime of the 
PDPA. Consequently, how “data” is to be construed will narrow or 
broaden the scope of personal data and the applicability of the PDPA. 
(a) Preliminary observations of “data” under the PDPA 
61 “Data” appears to include information recorded in both 
electronic and non-electronic form. Although a statutory definition for 
personal data is provided under the PDPA, the definition of “data” is 
absent from the Act. The PDPC has also thus far not provided guidance 
on the constitution of “data”. Parliament has, however, shed some light 
on this issue. During the second reading of the Bill, the Minister stated 
that “[t]he definition [of personal data] also covers personal data 
recorded in both electronic and non-electronic formats”.82 Referencing 
the above, it would thus follow that “data” would cover information, 
written or otherwise recorded (eg, audio/visual), in manual or 
electronic/digital format. There are also no other qualifiers unlike in 
some jurisdictions, which will be elaborated in the paragraphs below. 
(b) Cross-jurisdictional comparisons 
62 Compared with some of the referenced jurisdictions, “data” 
under the PDPA has a broader meaning and is consistent with a broad 
and expansive reading of personal data. Under the UK DPA, from which 
Malaysia’s Personal Data Protection Act 201083 took substantial 
guidance, information is only “data” when the information is processed84 
or recorded with the intention to be processed85 by “equipment 
operating automatically in response to instructions given for that 
purpose” or when the information “is recorded as part of a relevant 
filing system or with the intention that it should form part of a relevant 
filing system”.86 In contrast, “data” under the PDPA is broader in scope as 
                                                                       
82 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
83 Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (No 709 of 2010) (M’sia) s 4. This Act entered 
into immediate effect after it was gazetted on 15 November 2013. 
84 Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK) s 1(1)(a). 
85 Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK) s 1(1)(b). 
86 Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK) s 1(1)(c). 
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the means and reason for recording the information is unstated and is 
hence not a requirement. 
63 Hong Kong’s Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 199587 
(“PDPO”) also has a more restricted view. Under the PDPO, “data” is 
taken to mean “any representation of information (including an 
expression of opinion) in any document, and includes a personal 
identifier”.88 “Data” under the PDPA is thus also broader in scope as it 
does not require a “personal identifier”. 
64 Further, this wide and expansive view of “data” under the PDPA 
is also supported by some of the referenced jurisdictions, notably the 
EU, Australia and Canada. As noted by the Article 29 Working Group of 
the EU Data Protection Directive, “data” can include “information 
available in whatever form, be it alphabetical, numerical, graphical, 
photographical or acoustic”.89 Implicit in this understanding of “data” is 
that all that is required is for information to be recorded regardless of its 
form, which is an understanding that is consistent with “data” under the 
PDPA. 
65 In Australia, although the Privacy Act 198890 states that 
“personal information”, the analogue to personal data under the PDPA, 
includes information “whether recorded in a material form or not”, the 
Australian judiciary has adjudged this as meaning that information 
should still be recorded albeit not always in material form. Specifically, 
the Australian Court of Appeal held that:91 
It is almost impossible to conceive how almost all those [data 
protection] sections … could operate in practice if they were intended 
to apply to information in the minds of employees acquired by direct 
visual or aural experience and never recorded in any manner. 
66 This understanding and interpretation of “data” under the 
PDPA is, however, not the widest among the referenced jurisdictions. 
New Zealand and Canada have read a wider meaning of “data” into the 
Privacy Act 1993 (“NZPA”) and PIPEDA respectively. Even though the 
NZPA and PIPEDA do not define “information”, the analogue to “data” 
under the PDPA, “information” has been judicially defined in both 
Canada and New Zealand as including unrecorded information.92 As 
noted by the Law Commission of New Zealand, “unrecorded matter 
                                                                       
87 Cap 486. 
88 Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 1995 (Cap 486) (Hong Kong) s 2. 
89 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 7. 
90 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth) s 6. 
91 Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM [2005] NSWCA 192 at [28]. 
92 Paul Roth, Privacy Law and Practice (Wellington: LexisNexis, Privacy Act 1993, 
Looseleaf, 2007) PVA 2.12 at p 152. 
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held in a person’s mind can be ‘information’”.93 That unrecorded 
information can constitute personal data is also affirmed by the 
Canadian Federal Court, which held that the lack of recording only 
affects the issue of collection of personal data but not the fact that the 
information is personal data.94 
67 This wider reading of “data” is not without its problems. As 
acknowledged by the Law Commission of New Zealand in its review of 
the NZPA,95 “evidential problems may arise”96 especially over the 
existence of the information concerned and whether its content can be 
“known, accepted or understood” with any precision.97 The Law 
Commission of New Zealand has also noted that “the inclusion of 
information that exists only in a person’s mind appears to set the NZPA 
apart from most overseas privacy legislation”.98 
(c) “Data” as recorded information under the PDPA 
68 Notwithstanding the broader scope of “data” found in the 
NZPA and PIPEDA which would make it ostensibly more consistent 
with the broad and expansive reading of personal data under the PDPA, 
it is submitted that “data” under the PDPA should apply only to 
recorded information. Besides the difficulties associated with admitting 
unrecorded information as noted in the previous paragraph, adopting a 
reading of “data” that requires recorded information is also more 
consistent with the majority of jurisdictions and in line with global 
trends. New Zealand and Canada are the only two referenced 
jurisdictions that admit unrecorded information. Hence a reading of 
“data” that requires recorded information should be adopted under  
the PDPA as it promotes the purpose of putting Singapore on par  
with major economies that have data protection laws so as to facilitate 
trans-boundary data transfer. It will also obviate evidentiary problems 
for administrators and organisations. 
69 On the other hand, adopting a definition of “data” as including 
information that is recorded by any means and in any form is consistent 
with the technology-neutral nature of the PDPA. During the second 
reading of the Bill, the Minister stated that “it is important to note that 
                                                                       
93 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17, March 2010) at para 3.6. 
94 Morgan v Alta Flights Inc (2006) FCA 121 at [20]. 
95 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17, March 2010) at para 3.6. 
96 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17, March 2010) at para 3.10. 
97 A and A v G (13 July 1999) Complaints Review Tribunal 18/99 at para 16. 
98 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17, March 2010) at para 3.6. 
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the Bill adopts a principle-based and technology-neutral approach and 
it does not require that organisations put in place costly systems to 
manage and safeguard personal data”.99 That “data” under the PDPA is 
indifferent to the means and form in which information is recorded  
and kept means that it can easily lend itself to new technological 
developments. Furthermore, technological neutrality also promotes the 
interests of private organisations as compliance costs will likely be better 
managed when private organisations can elect the most cost effective 
technological solution for their personal data needs. Needless to say, it 
will also meet the expectations of individuals seeking greater protection, 
since more and more of their personal data is being recorded and stored 
in the electronic/digital format. 
(2) “[W]hether true or not” 
70 As observed earlier in this article, the qualifier of “whether true 
or not” found in the definition of personal data under the PDPA, was 
probably inspired by Australia’s Privacy Act100 (“AUPA”). The AUPA also 
has this qualifier worded in the exact same way.101 As advised by the 
PDPC, the operation of this qualifier means that personal data under 
the PDPA “does not depend on whether the data is true or false”.102 In 
other words, the veracity of information is irrelevant when considering 
whether certain “data” is personal data under the PDPA. Explicit in the 
PDPC’s advisory is therefore the view that false information identifying 
an individual could still be considered personal data. 
(a) False information 
71 While not specifically mentioned in their respective data 
protection legislations, the view that false information could constitute 
personal data nevertheless appears to be shared by the other referenced 
jurisdictions. As noted by the Article 29 Working Party in WP136, “[f]or 
information to be ‘personal data’, it is not necessary that it be true or 
proven”.103 In Canada, it also appears that false information could be 
considered personal data as the Canadian judiciary allows the filing of 
data protection complaints based on false information that identifies  
an individual.104 In its review of the NZPA, the New Zealand Law 
                                                                       
99 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
100 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth). 
101 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth) s 6. 
102 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.7. 
103 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 6. 
104 Lawson v Accusearch Inc 2007 FC 125 at [9]. 
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Commission also stated that, “with regard to false information, it seems 
clear that this is covered by the Privacy Act”.105 
72 Although the UK and Hong Kong are silent on this issue, they 
are probably amenable to false information being considered as personal 
data. As noted by the New Zealand Law Commission, “if false 
information did not fall within the coverage of ‘personal information’, 
principle 7 (which concerns correction of inaccurate information) 
would be nonsensical”.106 The authors find this argument to be 
persuasive. Hence, on that analysis, given that the UK and Hong Kong’s 
data protection legislation both provide for the correction of inaccurate 
information under their respective data protection legislation, it 
logically follows that they would also consider false information as 
personal data. This logical extrapolation would similarly apply to the 
PDPA given that the correction of inaccurate personal data is also 
provided for under s 22 of the Act. 
(b) Expressions of opinion 
73 Besides false information, expressions of opinion could possibly 
also constitute personal data through the qualifier of “whether true or 
not”. As noted, expressions of opinion are typically subjective in nature 
and it is not uncommon for expressions of opinion to be factually 
inaccurate to some extent. The admission of expressions of opinion 
would thus often require the use of this qualifier. Subjective types of 
information can include an opinion of facets of a person (ie, profiling) 
based on the evaluation of that individual’s character, habits, preferences 
and proclivities through the assessment of his or her behaviour. There is 
a level of subjectivity inherent in such determinations that support 
opinion as personal data. This approach is not controversial or new.  
For example, the AUPA refers to “personal data” as “information or  
an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a 
database)”.107 
74 However, unlike the Australian example, the PDPA does not 
clearly or specifically include opinion as a form of personal data, 
notwithstanding the possibility of utilising the qualifier of “whether true 
or not” to include expressions of opinion as personal data. On the one 
hand, it would appear from the examination of the PDPA and the PDPC 
guidelines108 that expressions of opinion cannot be personal data under 
                                                                       
105 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17, March 2010) at para 3.6. 
106 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17, March 2010) at para 3.12. 
107 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth) s 6(1). 
108 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013). 
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the PDPA. The term “opinion of expression” was specifically removed 
from the PDPA’s adaptation of the DPA’s definition of personal data. 
There is also no mention of expression of opinion under the PDPC 
guidelines. 
75 However, the authors of this article take the view, based on the 
earlier reasons given, that expressions of opinion should be personal 
data. Given the principle that identifiability of individuals is the crux to 
information constituting personal data, expression of opinion should be 
personal data if it is recorded and can similarly identify an individual. 
Specifically, it may be illusory to maintain that there is a difference 
between opinion and fact in relation to personal data. Whether 
information that can identify an individual, for instance about his 
preference for certain clothing brands, came about from the individual 
himself or from an analysis of his spending patterns should be 
immaterial in the determination of personal data. Moreover, in some 
cases, it may be difficult to separate what is a fact or an opinion about 
an individual. Maintaining this difference thus risks creating a possible 
loophole that can be exploited. Opinions about an individual, such as 
his or her interests and hobbies, also form an important and 
increasingly larger proportion of personal information collected and 
used, especially for sales and marketing purposes (eg, for target 
advertising). Finally, it should be noted that the Act also has provisions 
that refer to opinions (“including a professional or an expert opinion”) 
and information for an evaluative purpose, which deal with various 
facets of a person’s character that go beyond objective facts.109 
76 As such, accepting opinion into the equation will avoid all these 
problems while providing greater protection for the individual under 
the broad and expansive reading of the PDPA provisions. That all the 
referenced jurisdictions recognise the potential for expressions of 
opinion to be personal data should also persuade the PDPC to take the 
view that opinions could be admitted as personal data under the PDPA. 
                                                                       
109 See s 22(6) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) in relation to 
an organisation’s right not to have its opinions about an individual corrected, and 
the Second to Sixth Scheds that exempt an organisation from seeking consent (for 
collection, use and disclosure) and from the requirements to provide access and 
correction, respectively. It is of interest to note that personal data for evaluative 
purposes is generally exempted, hence providing a measure of relief to 
organisations (ie, in favour of their interest) due to the inclusion of expressions of 
opinion into the meaning of personal data (which is in the interest of the data 
subject). 
© 2014 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 
380 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2014) 26 SAcLJ 
 
(3) “[A]bout an individual” 
77 Data about an individual is the “most basic requirement for 
data to constitute personal data”.110 It is a separate inquiry (and element) 
from identifiability of a person. However, despite its importance, 
guidance from the PDPC on what constitutes data about an individual 
remains relatively scant. Specifically, the PDPC states that: “Data about 
an individual includes any data that relates to the individual”.111 
78 As noted at an earlier part of this article, the PDPA departed 
from the UK’s DPA in adopting the term “about” as opposed to “relate 
to”. As a result, two different readings of “about” which differ in their 
scope is possible. Information “about” or that “relates to” an individual 
can be given an expansive or narrow meaning. 
(a) Narrow view of “about an individual” 
79 One view, supported by Australia and New Zealand, is that the 
PDPA construes data about an individual in a more restrictive manner 
as the use of “about” connotes a narrower scope of association 
compared to that of “relate to”. In this regard, the Judiciary in New 
Zealand has stated that “[t]he fact that information may become 
relevant to someone does not necessarily convert it into information 
‘about’ that person”.112 It has also been noted that “[t]he Australian 
definition [of “about”] … reduces the scope of ‘relating to’ because it 
requires the information itself to have the capacity to identify without 
reference to other information”113 although as earlier noted in this 
article, there is now no such reduction of scope following the recent 
amendment of the AUPA. 
(b) Broad view of “about an individual” 
80 Alternatively, if one takes the view that the change to “about” 
from “relate to” is immaterial and that the two terms are synonymous, 
the PDPA could construe data about an individual in a much broader 
manner identical to that adopted by the EU. As explained in WP136, 
“[i]n general terms, information can be considered to ‘relate’ to an 
individual when it is about that individual”.114 
                                                                       
110 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.3. 
111 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.4. 
112 CBN v McKenzie Associates [2004] NZHRRT 48 at [39]. 
113 Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, “The Conceptual Basis of Personal Information in 
Australian Privacy Law” [2010] MurUEJL 1 at 13. 
114 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 9. 
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81 Specifically, the Article 29 Working Party considered that data 
could “relate” to an individual if any of the three elements, viz, a “content”, 
“purpose” or “result” element is present.115 The “content” element is 
present when the “information is given about a particular person, 
regardless of any purpose on the side of the data controller … or the 
impact of that information on the data subject”116 [emphasis added]. 
The “purpose” element exists when the information is used or is likely to 
be used “with the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence 
the status or behaviour of an individual”117 [emphasis added]. Lastly,  
a “result” element is present when the use of the information “is likely to 
have an impact on a certain person’s rights and interests”118 [emphasis 
added]. These approaches are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive and 
they all cover both objective and subjective forms of information. For 
example, purpose-based assessment covers subjective information such 
as data collected in order to evaluate, influence or in any other manner 
affect a person. It can be said that purpose and result based assessments 
are more contextual in nature, which are just as important as raw 
objective content.119 They are often intricately linked. This is also 
indirectly acknowledged in the definition itself that refers to a 
combination of information as constituting personal data. 
(c) UK’s privacy-based view of “about an individual” 
82 The UK, however, adopted a narrower but privacy-based view 
of “relate to” even though the DPA was required to be in line with the 
EU Data Protection Directive. Following Durant, a 2003 English Court 
of Appeal decision, the UK appears to have taken a narrower view of the 
meaning of information that “relates to” a person. Specifically, Auld LJ 
in Durant held that there are two notions in which information “relates 
to” an individual and stated that:120 
The first is whether the information is biographical in a significant sense, 
that is, going beyond the recording of the putative data subject’s 
                                                                       
115 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 10. 
116 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 10. 
117 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 10. 
118 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, WP 136 (20 June 2007) at p 11. 
119 “Focusing on the actual content of a particular data entry improperly negates the 
importance of contextual inferences”. Scott Rempell, “Privacy, Personal Data and 
Subject Access Rights in the European Data Directive and Implementing UK 
Statute: Durant v Financial Services Authority as a Paradigm of Data Protection 
Nuances and Emerging Dilemmas” (2006) 18 Fla J Int’l L 807 at 831, criticising the 
court’s narrow construction of what constitutes personal data in Durant v Financial 
Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746. 
120 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 at [28]. 
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involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal 
connotations, a life event in respect of which his privacy could not be 
said to be compromised. The second is one of focus. The information 
should have the putative data subject as its focus rather than some 
other person with whom he may have been involved or some 
transaction or event in which he may have figured or have had an 
interest, for example, as in this case, an investigation into some other 
person’s or body’s conduct that he may have instigated. In short, it is 
information that affects his privacy, whether in his personal or family life, 
business or professional capacity. [emphasis added] 
This privacy-based view of “relate to” means that personal data under 
the DPA will also be construed in a more limited manner when 
compared to WP136’s articulation of “relate to” although this view will 
still be broader than the view taken by Australia and New Zealand. 
Under Durant, biographically insignificant data would not be personal 
data, even though this would still be personal data under WP136. On a 
separate but related note, it is interesting and apposite to note that this 
privacy-based view is very similar to what has been adopted by the 
Canadian judiciary121 even though the PIPEDA uses the term “about an 
identifiable individual” as opposed to “relate to”. 
83 Efforts to reconcile these two approaches to “relate to” have 
been unsuccessful thus far. Even though the UK Information 
Commissioner maintains that its technical guidance on determining 
what is personal data (“technical guidance”) “is consistent with [both] 
the approach taken by the [Article 29] Working Party [and Durant]”,122 it 
is hard to see how the technical guidance reconciles the two conflicting 
approaches. To try to align the technical guidance with both Durant  
and WP136, the UK Information Commissioner added the above two 
notions of “relate to” under Durant to the three elements found in 
WP136 to the technical guidance. However, this only ensured that the 
technical guidance is in line with WP136 but not Durant. Biographically 
insignificant data still cannot be personal data under Durant but the 
technical guidance has no such prohibition. 
84 A tension hence emerged between the technical guidance of  
the UK Information Commissioner, that supports WP136, and Durant, 
and this tension has not gone unnoticed. In Mr Tony Harcup v The 
Information Commissioner and Yorkshire Forward123 (“Harcup”), the UK 
                                                                       
121 Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Transportation Accident 
Investigation and Safety Board) 2006 FCA 157. 
122 United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection Technical 
Guidance – Determining What is Personal Data (12 December 2012) at p 3. 
123 EA/2007/0058. 
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Informational Tribunal124 remarked that “[they] have difficulty in 
reconciling the approach in the Guidance [of the Information 
Commissioner] with that in Durant”.125 The Article 29 Working Party 
also noted, in a separate opinion,126 that:127 
… in so far as such an interpretation [as a result of the decision in 
Durant] restricts the definition of personal data of the Directive, this 
may compromise the extent to which the Jersey legislation [which is  
in pari materia with the DPA] protects Personal Data. 
85 However, a recent Court of Appeal decision appears to reduce 
the significance and influence of the Durant case, albeit without 
overruling that decision. In Edem v The Information Commissioner & 
Financial Services Authority128 (“Edem”), the Court of Appeal did not 
overturn Durant with its “biographical significance” or “focus” analysis 
of the “relate to” requirement; however, the court distinguished Durant 
and seemed to relegate those narrow grounds to “borderline cases”.129 In 
Edem itself, which was not such a borderline case, the name itself, which 
was the subject matter of the dispute, constituted personal data. The 
only exception would be the case where a name is so common that it 
will not be able to identify an individual.130 Thus, the court seems to 
signal that the tests in Durant are not strict and do not have to be 
universally applied to the point of absurdity in some cases following 
Durant. The effects of this new twist on future cases and whether the 
                                                                       
124 The Information Tribunal heard appeals from notices issued by the Information 
Commissioner under the Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK) and other Acts. In 
2010, the Information Tribunal was absorbed into the General Regulatory 
Chamber (“GRC”) and now forms part of the First-tier Tribunal (Information 
Rights) of the GRC. 
125 Mr Tony Harcup v The Information Commissioner and Yorkshire Forward 
EA/2007/0058 at [20]. 
126 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2007 on the Level of Protection 
of Personal Data in Jersey, WP 141 (9 October 2007). 
127 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2007 on the Level of Protection 
of Personal Data in Jersey, WP 141 (9 October 2007) at p 4. 
128 [2014] EWCA Civ 92. 
129 The Court of Appeal in Edem v The Information Commissioner & Financial Services 
Authority [2014] EWCA Civ 92 (“Edem”) referred to the opinion of Buxton LJ (in 
Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 at [79]) that “[t]he 
notions … will, with respect, provide a clear guide in borderline cases”. See Edem 
at [15]. Thus, the significance and reach of Durant is confined to similar types of 
“borderline cases”, although what constitutes a borderline case is likely to be a fresh 
issue to be determined. 
130 This use of a clear link or obvious reference to the person in question whose 
identity is the subject of the dispute over personal data was provided for in the 
Information Commissioner’s Technical Guidance and referred to with approval by 
the court in Edem v The Information Commissioner & Financial Services Authority 
[2014] EWCA Civ 92 at [21]. The court’s approach has its own problems by 
conflating the separate requirements of “about”/“relate to” and the identification 
elements (although they can overlap to some extent). 
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Durant anomaly will be confined to the facts of that (and similar) cases 
remains to be seen. 
(d) Adopting the broad view of “about an individual” 
86 From the above, it is clear that the PDPA can adopt one of the 
three above-mentioned views on what “about an individual” should 
mean under the Act. Even though each of the views has some merits, the 
authors endorse the broad view of “about an individual”. 
87 The view that “about” is narrower than “relate to”, adopted by 
Australia and New Zealand, is arguably persuasive as the PDPA also uses 
“about” and not “relate to”. However, that the PDPC in its guidance131 
made it clear that the term “about” is synonymous with “relate to” 
means that this view is probably misconstrued. 
88 The UK privacy-based way of reading “relate to” is also arguably 
persuasive as the personal definition provision in both the PDPA and 
DPA share an almost identical structure. However, this view is likely to 
be untenable. As noted earlier in this article, the right of privacy is not 
recognised in Singapore and given that the PDPA “does not seek to 
change any right or obligation conferred by or imposed under the 
common law”,132 a privacy-based view of data protection similar to the 
UK should not apply here. Moreover, as noted, this reading of the 
phrase has its own problems, which the Singapore courts should be 
cautious not to follow. 
89 That the PDPC’s guidance133 equates the term “about” with 
“relate to” means that the EU’s broad view, which is based on “relate to”, 
is persuasive. Furthermore, the PDPA’s adoption of the EU’s broad view 
on “relate to” will also likely provide useful guidance for local 
jurisprudence on the issue as it will also allow the Singapore courts to 
use the non-privacy based tri-element framework that consists of 
“content”, “purpose” and “result” as outlined in WP136. Besides, this is 
also the only view that supports a broad and expansive reading of 
personal data as the other two views invariably narrow the scope of 
personal data by having a more limited understanding of what 
constitutes “about an individual” under the PDPA. If this approach is 
taken, it will also be consistent with accepting that expressions of 
                                                                       
131 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.3. 
132 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 October 2012) “Personal Data 
Protection Bill” vol 89 (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, Minister for 
Communications and Information). 
133 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.3. 
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opinion can also constitute personal data, since it has some relation with 
the “purpose” element. 
90 In fact, it can be said that the whole purpose requirement and 
the objective of greater individual control over his or her personal 
information supports the argument that that information should be 
relevant or significant in some sense (ie, have some value, monetary or 
otherwise, directly or indirectly). This is also consistent with the focus 
on the need of organisations for such information (which often goes 
beyond biographical data alone) and the time-based requirement for the 
management and storage of such information. In Singapore, as the 
PDPA is not based on the notion of privacy at all, the UK position in 
Durant is unpersuasive and should not be followed. Instead, the more 
popular and more generous interpretation of this requirement should 
be followed. The difference between “about” and “relate to” is also 
irrelevant. 
(4) “[A]n individual who can be identified” 
91 Identifiability of the individual is another substantial element in 
the definition of personal data under the PDPA. It is a prerequisite for 
an individual to be identifiable before the “data” in question becomes 
personal data that can enjoy the protection accorded under the Act. 
While the previous elements of “data”, “whether true or not” and (to a 
lesser extent) “about an individual” are mainly focused on the 
informational aspect of personal data, the identifiability element of “an 
individual who can be identified”134 is focused mainly on the data 
subject, that is the individual who is or who can be identified by the 
“data” at hand, as well as any other information that is accessible to the 
organisation in question relating to the person of interest. 
92 The PDPC has provided more guidance on this matter. The 
PDPC has advised that “[a]n individual can be identified if that 
individual can be singled out from other individuals by an organisation 
based on one or more characteristics of the data or other pieces of 
information”.135 Further, identification of an individual can either be 
conducted “directly” or “indirectly”. Where “an individual may be 
identified from a piece or set of personal data”, such an individual is 
“directly” identified.136 However, if “an individual [is] … identified based 
on certain data and other information to which the organisation has or 
                                                                       
134 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
135 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.9. 
136 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.10. 
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is likely to have access” then this individual is “indirectly” identified.137 
However, notwithstanding the above guidance provided by the PDPC, 
four areas of uncertainty remain. 
(a) Burden of proof in identification 
93 First, uncertainty remains over the burden of proof required in 
the identification of individuals as the PDPC has, thus far, been silent on 
this issue. Does this mean that identification is to be assessed on a 
balance of probabilities or, as aptly put by the New Zealand Law 
Commission which was considering the issue, “is it reasonably 
practicable, rather than merely theoretically possible, to identify the 
individual?”138 
94 The other referenced jurisdictions have taken differing views on 
this issue. For example, Canada takes the view that an individual is 
identifiable when there is a “serious possibility”139 that an individual 
could be identified through the use of that information, alone or in 
combination with other available information. In contrast, Australia and 
Hong Kong have provided in their legislation, the standard of 
“reasonableness”, which means “reasonably ascertainable”140 or 
“reasonably identifiable”141 in the case of the former and “reasonably 
practicable”142 in the latter case. Meanwhile, the EU position is that the 
identifiability of an individual is assessed by looking at all the means 
“likely reasonably”143 used by the identifying party. As for the UK, the 
UK Information Commissioner has stated that:144 
[T]he fact that there is a very slight hypothetical possibility that 
someone might be able to reconstruct the data in such a way that the 
data subject is identified is not sufficient to make the individual 
identifiable … [and that the] person processing the data must 
consider all the factors at stake. 
                                                                       
137 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 5.11. 
138 Law Commission of New Zealand, Review of the Privacy Act 1997 – Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 4 (Issues Paper 17 March 2010) at para 3.22. 
139 Gordon v Canada (Health) 2008 FC 258 at [34]. 
140 Privacy Act 1988 (Act No 119 of 1988) (Cth) s 6. 
141 Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Act No 197 of 
2012) (Cth) s 6. 
142 Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 1995 (Cap 486) (Hong Kong) s 2(1). 
143 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (24 October 
1995) (protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data) at Recital 26. 
144 United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection Technical 
Guidance – Determining What is Personal Data (21 August 2007) at p 8. 
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Further, the UK Information Commissioner also noted that:145 
When considering identifiability it should be assumed that you are not 
looking just at the means reasonably likely to be used by the ordinary 
man in the street, but also the means that are likely to be used by a 
determined person with a particular reason to want to identify 
individuals. 
95 Although it thus remains uncertain as to which view the PDPA 
prescribes, it is submitted that the UK’s views on this issue ought to be 
persuasive. The DPA shares the exact wording of “who can be identified” 
with the PDPA. Furthermore, setting the burden of proof for 
identifiability at a higher level than theoretical possibility as the UK has 
done by discounting “very slight hypothetical possibilit[ies]” and 
“consider[ing] all the factors at stake”, is also aligned with Parliament’s 
intention to keep compliance manageable and reasonable. 
(b) “[L]ikely to have access” 
96 Secondly, the meaning of “likely” as employed by “indirect” 
identification under the PDPA remains unclear. While “direct” 
identification appears to be straightforward and involves determining 
whether all the “data” at hand identifies an individual, “indirect” 
identification is less so. 
97 Under the PDPA, individuals can be “indirectly” identified in 
two ways. First, an individual is identified “indirectly” if the identifying 
party is “in the possession of [‘other information’]”146 and that “other 
information” when combined with the data at hand identifies an 
individual. This mode of “indirect” identification is not unlike “direct” 
identification. The identification of an individual is through the 
combination of “other information” as held by the identifying party 
with the data at hand; hence, the only difference that this form of 
“indirect” identification has with “direct” information is the additional 
determination of the possession of “other information” by the 
identifying party. 
98 Alternatively, an individual is also “indirectly” identified if the 
identifying party is “likely to come into the possession of [‘other 
information’]”147 and that the “other information” when combined with 
the data at hand identifies an individual. In this situation, however, there 
is the additional requirement to determine the content of the “other 
information” and the “likely” possession of such “other information”  
                                                                       
145 United Kingdom, Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection Technical 
Guidance – Determining What is Personal Data (21 August 2007) at p 9. 
146 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
147 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
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by the identifying party. The degree of identifiability in “indirect” 
identification in this circumstance is more uncertain. The assessment 
involves determining what the acceptable sources of such additional 
information are and the ease and ability of the identifying party to avail 
itself of such information. 
99 The PDPC has thus far not provided any guidance on what 
“likely” entails under the PDPA. There has also been no pronouncement 
on this issue from the UK, the only referenced jurisdiction that shares 
this sub-provision with the PDPA. Notwithstanding the above, it is 
submitted that “likely” could either connote “reasonably practicable”, 
“probable” (that is more likely than not on a balance of probabilities) or 
“theoretically possible”. In the authors’ view, “likely” as “probable” 
should be adopted. 
100 Adopting a “reasonably practicable” view is arguably undesirable. 
Prima facie, reading reasonable practicability into “likely” appears to be 
at odds with the plain meaning of “likely”. The plain meaning of “likely” 
is descriptive and suggests a state of possibility but reasonable 
practicability is necessarily prescriptive as the identifying party would be 
obliged to possess “other information” when it is reasonably practicable. 
Further, adopting the view of “likely” as reasonably practicable also 
appears to be duplicitous, given that the means of identification is 
considered reasonably practicable. 
101 Reading “theoretically possible” into “likely” should also be 
avoided. Notwithstanding the fact that “likely” on its face indicates a 
better chance of an event occurring than what is possible, having a 
meaning of possible possession as opposed to probable possession of 
“other information” is likely to make compliance overly onerous as it 
would unduly expand the scope of applicable “other information”. 
102 Thus, adopting the view of “likely” as being “probable”, that is, 
more likely than not on a balance of probabilities, better conforms  
to the plain meaning of “likely” and is consistent with Parliament’s 
intention to prevent compliance costs from becoming too onerous on 
private organisations. 
103 For completeness, it should be noted that the addition of 
“access” serves to create yet another safeguard against an overly 
expansive definition under the PDPA as it is submitted that “data” must 
be accessible to an organisation before it can be considered to be 
personal data. Accessibility in this context refers to the ability of an 
organisation to obtain such “other data” that can used with the “data” at 
hand to constitute personal data. Such “other data” can include “publicly 
available information” (an issue that will be further considered below) 
as well as existing information that belongs to the organisation or 
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information held by its affiliates and partners that the organisation has 
the ability and/or the right to obtain if required. Hence, where 
information is not “accessible”, this will have an impact on both the 
content and “likely” element of the “other data”. The content of the 
“other data” will in this case be undeterminable while the inability to 
obtain such “other data” means that it cannot be “likely”. 
(c) Personal data in indirect identification 
104 Lastly, uncertainty also remains over whether data used to 
“indirectly” identify individuals are by themselves personal data. As 
recalled earlier, “indirect” identification occurs when the identifying 
party makes use of the “data” at hand together with “other information” 
to identify an individual. Specifically, there is the issue of whether a 
piece of data that is used in conjunction with personal data to identify 
an individual will be personal data. Even though the combined 
information is undoubtedly personal data, it is unclear if such data by 
itself would be considered personal data. 
105 No guidance on this issue has yet emerged from the PDPC. 
However, helpfully, guidance can be obtained from the UK which, in the 
DPA,148 has an in pari materia sub-provision with the PDPA149 on 
“indirect” identification. In Common Services Agency for the Scottish 
Health v the Scottish Information Commissioner150 (“Common Services”), 
Lord Hope, with the agreement of Lord Hoffman, Lord Mance and 
Lord Rodger, in the House of Lords gave the following holding:151 
The relevant part of the definition … directs attention to ‘those 
data’, … and to ‘other information’ which is or may come to be in the 
possession of the data controller. ‘Those data’ will be ‘personal data’ if, 
taken together with the ‘other information’, they enable a living 
individual to whom the data relate to be identified. The formula which 
this part of the definition uses indicates that each of these two 
components must have a contribution to make to the result. Clearly, if 
the ‘other information’ is incapable of adding anything … [t]he ‘other 
information’ will have no part to play in the identification. The same 
result would seem to follow if ‘those data’ have been put into a form 
from which the individual or individuals to whom they relate cannot 
be identified at all, even with the assistance of the other information 
from which they were derived. In that situation a person who has 
access to both sets of information will find nothing in ‘those data’ that 
will enable him to make the identification. It will be the other 
                                                                       
148 Data Protection Act 1998 (c 29) (UK) s 1(1)(b). 
149 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
150 [2008] UKHL 47. 
151 Common Services Agency for the Scottish Health v the Scottish Information 
Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47 at [24]. 
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information only, and not anything in ‘those data’, that will lead him to 
this result. [emphasis added] 
106 It thus appears from Common Services that in order for “data” or 
“other information” to constitute personal data when “indirectly” 
identifying individuals, both of these elements “must have a contribution 
to make” to the identification of the individual. This position is logical 
and the greater implication that stems from this conclusion is that it 
prevents an overly wide definition of personal data. To decide otherwise 
would open the floodgates for almost any data or information that is 
used in conjunction with personal data to be classified as personal data 
simply by association. 
(d) The relationship between “likely to have access” and “publicly 
available” data 
107 Another interesting issue has to do with the relationship 
between the phrase “information to which the organisation … is likely 
to have access” and “personal data that is publicly available”, which 
appears under the Second to Fourth Scheds (and for which an exception 
from the requirement to obtain consent applies).152 
108 It is to be noted that the phrase “the personal data is publicly 
available” appears under the above-mentioned Schedules, whereas 
“personal data” is defined in the body of the Act, under the 
interpretation provision.153 If it is to have the same meaning in the 
exception as in the interpretation, then the logical conclusion is that all 
the information referred to – new, old and accessible – must be public 
for the exception to apply. If the understanding is that the entire set of 
data must be publicly available for the exception to apply (ie, rather than 
only that component that is publicly available), then it reasonably follows 
that publicly available data as a component of identifiable data (ie, a mix 
of private and public information) can also constitute personal data (as 
long as that set of data remains intact). That means that information 
within an organisation’s reach or “access” can still include publicly 
available information, if that data in itself cannot identify an individual 
but can, combined with data at hand and other (non-public) accessible 
data, contribute to the identification of an individual. 
109 Alternatively, it may be argued that any component data 
whatsoever, even that which in itself cannot identify an individual, falls 
under the exception. In such a case, a more complicated problem arises. 
                                                                       
152 Paragraph 1(c) of Second Sched, para 1(c) of the Third Sched and para 1(d) of the 
Fourth Sched read with s 17 of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 
2012). 
153 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
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On the positive side, an organisation can exclude more “personal data” 
from the consent requirement for collection, use and disclosure on the 
basis that an integral link in the chain that forms identifiable 
information is exempted. On the other hand, the task of the 
organisation (as well as the complainant and investigator) is rendered 
that much more complicated as they would have to break down each 
component of data (according to its source), determine and exclude 
public information, and then determine whether the rest of the data not 
so excluded can still identify an individual. 
110 The third possibility is that publicly available data does not 
constitute or does not fall under “other information” to which an 
organisation “is likely to have access”, which will have wider implications 
than the exception to the consent requirement. The definition of 
“publicly available” data as it is defined under s 2 does not refer to the 
word “access” but rather to what is “public”, which is not helpful.154 
However, if this approach is taken, then it does not make sense to have 
the exception for “publicly available” information under the said 
Schedules in the first place. Moreover, the ordinary meaning of 
accessible information has a wider meaning than public information. 
111 In the authors’ opinion, the first approach to reconciling the 
two types of information is the preferred and most logical approach. It 
is also a simpler solution to the issue and is consistent with their 
position on other non-public types of “other data” that “indirectly” 
identify an individual. 
C. Excluded personal data 
(1) Overview of exclusions 
112 Even when a piece or collection of information constitutes 
personal data, an individual or organisation that would otherwise be 
obligated to observe the PDPA requirements can still find respite under 
one of the general exceptions under s 4 (“Application of Act”). For 
example, “individuals acting in a personal or domestic capacity”, 
employees acting in the course of employment, data intermediaries, 
public agencies and organisations as well as specifically exempted 
entities under subsidiary legislation by the Minister. There are two other 
exclusions that shall be looked at in greater detail: information excluded 
                                                                       
154 As it stands, the fact that it is defined as such can either mean that (a) accessible 
information means information other than that which is ordinarily publicly 
available or (b) it is wider than (but including) publicly available information 
(eg, information available to all organisations within an industry or that can easily 
be obtained (for free or at a cost) from another organisation (eg, a data depository 
like a job search database). 
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due to time limitations and the exclusion of “business contact 
information”. 
113 In relation to the former, these include “personal data about an 
individual that is contained in a record that has been in existence for at 
least 100 years”,155 and “personal data about a deceased individual” who 
has been dead for longer than ten years.156 Even in relation to personal 
data about a deceased individual who has been dead for ten years or 
fewer, the PDPA provides a more limited form of protection, that is, 
only the application of “provisions relating to the disclosure of personal 
data and section 24 (protection of personal data)”.157 
(2) Some observations on business contact information 
114 While the first two categories of excluded personal data – that is 
personal data older than 100 years and about deceased individuals – are 
quite self-explanatory, some observations can be made on the exclusion 
of business contact information.158 Specifically, the definition of business 
contact information under the PDPA states that:159 
‘business contact information’ means an individual’s name, position 
name or title, business telephone number, business address, business 
electronic mail address or business fax number and any other similar 
information about the individual, not provided by the individual 
solely for his personal purposes … 
From this definition, three observations can be made. 
115 First, while a list of the different kinds of personal data has been 
provided under the definition above, this is not a closed list and “other 
similar” types of personal data could also become business contact 
information. This concept of similarity has two implications. First, it is 
submitted that this concept of business contact information is an 
affirmation of the technology-neutral nature of the PDPA as it is the 
informational and purpose aspect of the data that determines whether 
or not it is business contact information. 
116 Perhaps more importantly, this similarity also relates to the type 
of information that could fall within the business contact information 
exclusion; that is, only information that could be used to contact an 
individual could become business contact information. Hence, this 
means that not all information offered by an individual for a business 
                                                                       
155 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 4(4)(a). 
156 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 4(4)(b). 
157 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 4(4)(b). 
158 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 4(5). 
159 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
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purpose or “[not] solely for his personal purposes” will become business 
contact information even if provided voluntarily. For instance, the 
provision of a person’s national registration identity card (“NRIC”) 
number to sign up for a gym membership will not, under this view, be 
business contact information, as NRIC numbers cannot be used to 
contact a person. 
117 While this view has not been specifically endorsed by the PDPC, 
some support for this view can be found from the PDPC’s explanation 
of business contact information in the guidelines. For instance, the 
PDPC states that: 
The definition of business contact information is dependent on  
the purpose for which such contact information may be provided by 
an individual as it recognises that an individual may provide certain 
work-related contact information solely for personal purposes 
[emphasis added]. 
Moreover, by taking a more circumscribed view of what information 
could possibly become business contact information is also in line with 
the purpose of the PDPA which advocates a balance between the right of 
individuals to personal data protection against the need of organisations 
to collect, use and disclose personal data. Allowing a wide meaning of 
business contact information, that is, all information provided for 
business is business contact information, would, however, likely lead to 
exploitation by organisations at the expense of individuals. 
118 Second, it would also appear that for personal data to be 
business contact information, the personal data concerned needs to be 
given by the individual or collected with the consent of the individual 
identified by the personal data. Hence, where personal data has not been 
provided by or collected with the consent of the individual identified by 
the personal data, it is submitted that such personal data would not be 
excluded on the basis of it being business contact information. 
119 Third, it would appear that as long as personal data was “not 
provided by the individual solely for his personal purposes” [emphasis 
added], the personal data could be excluded as business contact 
information. This approach gives a rather expansive view of business 
contact information for, so long as personal data was provided with 
some business contact purpose in mind, regardless of how large or 
minor this factor was, the personal data would be excluded as business 
contact information. 
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VI. Conclusion 
120 As is evident from this article, the Singapore Parliament intends 
for the PDPA to provide a robust and nuanced data protection 
framework that serves to promote the rights of individuals to data 
protection, the needs of organisations for access to personal data and 
also Singapore’s efforts to become an international data hub that is 
jurisprudentially aligned with major economies. While some tensions 
exist between these different policy aspirations, it would appear that a 
purposive view of the PDPA would mean according a broad and 
expansive reading to personal data especially given the general scheme 
of the Act. 
121 Moreover, the PDPA also represents an ambitious effort by the 
Singapore government to create a data protection regime that best 
serves Singapore by, inter alia, incorporating the best and most suitable 
aspects of data protection regimes from the referenced foreign 
jurisdictions. However, as this article has shown, this is not without 
some difficulty and despite guidance from the PDPC, some 
uncertainties over the meaning of “personal data”, which is central to the 
coverage of the data protection provisions, remain. These include the 
proper approach to ascertaining the identifiability of an individual, what 
it is about an individual that is protected, the admissibility of 
expressions of opinion and the requirement for data to be recorded. 
Nevertheless, it is almost certain that some, if not all, of these 
uncertainties will be addressed in due course and that the concept and 
ambit of personal data under the PDPA will stabilise over time even 
though new questions over the PDPA will likely also emerge in their 
place. In the meantime, it is hoped that this article has made some 
useful suggestions on the ambit of “personal data” that can provide 
guidance to the stakeholders in the interim, and it is also hoped that the 
proposals will be considered and adopted by the PDPC and the courts 
when they have the opportunity to make an advisory and a ruling on 
the matter respectively. 
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Appendix 
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF PERSONAL DATA  
UNDER THE PDPA 
1 In deciding whether certain classes or types of information are 
personal data, it should be kept in mind that the general principle 
governing such determination is whether the information could by itself 
or with other information lead to the identification of an individual. 
2 As noted earlier, while it is certainly personal data if the 
information “directly” identifies the individual, where the information 
cannot by itself lead to the identification of an individual, much will 
then depend on the context at hand. Specifically, the information will 
only be personal data if the information can lead to “indirect” 
identification. Where “indirect” identification is involved, it is also 
important to recall from the earlier part of this article, that the 
information will only be personal data if it contributes to the 
identification of the individual. 
3 Lastly, notwithstanding the above determination, there is also 
the need to consider the purpose under which the information is 
provided, as personal data may otherwise be excluded as business 
contact information. 
4 In the following sections of this article, we will attempt to look 
at three common types of information – IP addresses, phone numbers 
and e-mail addresses – to determine whether they constitute personal 
data in the context of the PDPA by applying the above analysis. 
A. IP addresses 
5 With regard to IP addresses, it appears that much will depend 
on the context under which the IP address is collected. Specifically as 
noted by the PDPC, “an IP address, or any other network identifier such 
as an IMEI number, may not be personal data when viewed in isolation, 
because it simply identifies a networked device”.160 Thus IP addresses will 
not be personal data if IP addresses are collected solely for diagnostics 
or for tracking activities and the organisation cannot identify an 
individual from the data collected or from that data and other 
information to which that the organisation has or is likely to have 
access. 
                                                                       
160 Personal Data Protection Commission, “Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in 
the Personal Data Protection Act” (24 September 2013) at para 8.1. 
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6 Further, it is clear from the above that IP addresses cannot be 
used for “direct” identification of individuals. Consequently, IP addresses 
will only be considered personal data if they lead to the “indirect” 
identification of individuals and only if the IP addresses concerned 
contribute to the identification. For example, in a situation where a 
fixed IP address is assigned to a specific user account with an Internet 
Service Provider (“ISP”) that is registered to and used by a specific 
individual exclusively, the said IP address would be personal data from 
the perspective of the ISP. 
7 Lastly, given that IP addresses are seldom provided with the 
knowledge and consent of individuals or for the purpose of business 
contact, it is unlikely that IP addresses will be excluded as business 
contact information. 
B. Telephone numbers 
8 Like IP addresses, whether phone numbers will be personal data 
will largely be determined by the surrounding context. Given that 
telephone numbers do not identify individuals directly but instead 
identify specific telephony devices in the case of landlines or SIM cards 
in the case of mobile networks, telephone numbers, similar to 
IP addresses, will only be used for “indirect” identification of individuals. 
It thus follows that telephone numbers will only be personal data if they 
lead to the “indirect” identification of individuals and only if the 
telephone numbers concerned contribute to the identification. 
9 Unlike the case for IP addresses, “indirect” identification of 
individuals via telephone numbers is likely to be easier. Telephone 
numbers are often closely linked to an individual, whereas IP addresses 
are mostly assigned randomly by ISPs. This is especially true for mobile 
telephone numbers as they are more likely to be associated with a 
unique individual. 
10 Lastly, telephone numbers are more likely to be excluded as 
business contact information given that telephone numbers are 
routinely exchanged among individuals for business purposes. This view 
is supported by the PDPA, which among other possible types of 
personal data, lists telephone numbers in its definition of business 
contact information.161 
                                                                       
161 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
© 2014 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 Meaning and Scope of Personal Data  
(2014) 26 SAcLJ under the PDPA 397 
 
C. E-mail addresses 
11 Unlike IP addresses and telephone numbers, e-mail addresses 
can potentially be used to “directly” identify individuals. Specifically, 
where the e-mail address itself reflects information that can lead to the 
“direct” identification of individuals – such as a person’s full name, 
NRIC number or other similar types of information – they can 
constitute personal data. 
12 However, where the e-mail address does not reflect information 
that can lead to the “direct” identification of individuals, e-mail 
addresses will only be personal data if they lead to the “indirect” 
identification of individuals and only if the e-mail address concerned 
contributes to the identification. 
13 Lastly, similar to telephone numbers, e-mail addresses are also 
more likely to be excluded as business contact information given that  
e-mail addresses are increasingly (if not routinely) exchanged among 
individuals for business purposes. This view is supported by the PDPA, 
which among other possible types of personal data, lists e-mail addresses 
in its definition of business contact information.162 
 
                                                                       
162 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) s 2(1). 
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